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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EXTRAORDINARY
CASES
JONATHAN SKINNER-THOMPSON*
Ordinarily, courts apply the familiar Chevron two-step when
analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute.1 But what of
“extraordinary cases”—those involving “a question of deep economic
and political significance”?2 Scholars have struggled over the years to
place this “major questions” doctrine into the Chevron framework.3
One warns that this uncertainty could lead to a “chilling effect” on
agency action.4 Another views the doctrine as potentially more
nefarious—an unjustified power grab by the Supreme Court.5 And yet,
it might also be an “important and necessary concession,” a “safety
valve for Chevron.”6 While the doctrine seems to have reemerged in
recent years, we are now even more befuddled by its application.
Indeed, it has an “air of judicial improvisation.”7
This Essay recognizes that at least one Justice, newly appointed
Justice Kavanaugh, may be inclined to take the doctrine in still another
direction.8 So although this Essay attempts to reground the major
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1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (citing Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). “Under that framework, [courts] ask whether the statute is ambiguous and,
if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.” Id.
2. Id. at 2488–89.
3. See, e.g., Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the ‘Major Questions’ Doctrine, 5
MICH. J. OF ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479 (2016) (discussing emergence and challenges of major
questions doctrine); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (discussing
problems with the major questions doctrine).
4. See Jonas Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L.
REV. 445, 476–80 (2016) (discussing the “chilling effect” on agency action).
5. See generally Lisa Heizerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017)
(describing the new canons as “power canons”).
6. Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent ‘Major
Questions’ Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 359 (2016).
7. Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2202 (2016).
8. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that “major national policy positions must be made by
Congress and the President in the legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the Executive
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questions doctrine in its original step, Chevron step one, it also tries to
anticipate potential twists in light of Justice Kavanaugh’s prior
opinions9 and recent statements.10
Finally, this Essay explores ramifications of the major questions
doctrine, including its twists and turns, in view of an issue of utmost
economic and political significance: climate change.
Because the following sections discuss administrative law’s
extraordinary cases in the Chevron framework, it merits a brief
refresher. In applying Chevron, courts first—and always—examine
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”11 If the answer is clear, courts (and the agency) “must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”12 If the statute is
silent or ambiguous, in contrast, courts must determine whether the
agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”13 This framework is commonly referred to as the Chevron
two-step.
The Chevron two-step is not without its critics.14 The chief critique
is that Chevron’s second step denies the judiciary its constitutional
obligation to “say what the law is.”15 Because of this concern, courts
may be reluctant to cede interpretive authority to executive agencies
(especially out of a belief that those agencies are not politically
accountable). On the other hand, Chevron’s defenders have argued
that concluding “that a statute delegates power to an executive agency
is still an interpretation.”16 Thus, an implicit statutory delegation is not
branch.”). Justice Gorsuch might agree that the major questions doctrine stands for the
“constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that
power to an executive agency.” Gundy v. U.S., 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
9. See U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417–26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (discussing why the case should be heard on en banc).
10. See Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari)
(suggesting that “major national policy positions must be made by Congress and the President in
the legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the Executive branch”).
11. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
12. Id. at 843.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Academic highlight: Hamburger and Siegel on the
(May
17,
2018),
constitutionality
of
Chevron
deference,
SCOTUSBLOG
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/academic-highlight-hamburger-and-siegel-on-theconstitutionality-of-chevron-deference/ (discussing various views of justices and academics on the
Chevron two-step).
15. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
16. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV.
937, 942 (2018).
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“the power to interpret the statute, but the power to make a policy
choice within the limits . . . of the statute.”17 And, Chevron explains it
is in this policy space, which the judiciary must avoid venturing: “the
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views . . . are not judicial
ones.” Instead, the “Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
political branches.”18 While this Essay does not contend with the larger
constitutional debate over Chevron, the debate underscores growing
judicial discomfort in these extraordinary cases that may inform the
future of the major questions doctrine.
I. STEP ONE ORIGINS: MCI AND BROWN & WILLIAMSON
The origins of the major questions doctrine can be traced to two
core cases: MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph19 and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco.20 There may be
others to consider—for example, Cass Sunstein identifies a major
questions trilogy, adding Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon,21 whereas Jonas Monast considers
Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute22 the doctrine’s
foundation.23 But these two opinions embody the genesis (MCI) and
common refrain (Brown & Williamson) that lead to the doctrinal
incantation: “We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign
an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”24
A. MCI Telecommunications v. AT&T
MCI, as the first major questions case, addressed the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) attempt to exempt certain
common carriers from having to file tariffs with the Commission.25

17. Id. at 937.
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
19. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
20. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
21. 515 U.S. 687 (1995); see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 219 (citing Babbit in reference to the
“Step One trilogy”).
22. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
23. Monast, supra note 4, at 453. Blake Emerson would also consider the Industrial Union
case as “the clearest precedent for the major questions doctrine.” Blake Emerson, Administrative
Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation,
102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2044 (2018). However, the article does not include the case because it
predates Chevron. Id. at 2044 n.132.
24. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
25. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).
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AT&T, the sole dominant carrier, objected.26
The central dispute concerned the meaning of the phrase “modify
any requirement” in section 203(b)(2) of the Communications Act of
1934.27 After surveying several dictionaries, the Court found that the
word modify, “ha[ving] a connotation of increment or limitation,”
means “to change moderately or in minor fashion.”28 Accordingly, the
Commission’s policy could be justified only “if it makes a less than
radical or fundamental change in the Act’s tariff-filing requirement.”29
But it did not. Rate filings, the Court explained, are “the essential
characteristic of a rate-regulated industry.”30 The Commission’s policy,
however, fundamentally revised the statute.31 It is “highly unlikely that
Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be
entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—
and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle
device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”32
Accordingly, the Commission’s interpretation was not entitled to
deference because it went beyond the meaning that the statute can
bear.33
The case did not expressly identify a clear statement principle for
answering “major questions,” nor was it an “extraordinary” case. It
would come to be recognized, however, as a guiding principle for the
Court in pronouncing a new doctrine.
B. FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Nearly six years after MCI, the Court issued the seminal opinion
establishing the major questions doctrine. In Brown & Williamson, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had asserted jurisdiction over
tobacco products by concluding that nicotine is a “drug” within the
meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and finding that
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco constituted “combination products”
that deliver nicotine to the body.34 But “once the FDA fulfilled its
statutory obligation to classify tobacco products, it could not allow

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 222.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218–19.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
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them to be marketed.”35 In other words, “the Act would require the
agency to ban them.”36
Because the case involved the FDA’s interpretation of a statute
that it administered, the Court first asked “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”37 If so, the Court’s
inquiry would reach an end—the Court “must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”38 But the Court
explained that this inquiry “is shaped, at least in some measure, by the
nature of the question presented.”39 Major questions—and indeed,
extraordinary cases—may provide reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress had intended an implicit delegation of
authority through statutory ambiguity.40 In the case at hand, the FDA’s
assertion of jurisdiction over a significant and unique industry plainly
contradicted “Congress’ consistent judgment to deny the FDA this
power.”41 Guided by MCI, the Court concluded that “Congress could
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”42
In both MCI and Brown & Williamson, the Court focused its
inquiries on Congress’ unambiguous intent.43 This suggests that both
cases were decided at Chevron step one. In fact, Justice Scalia later
objected to the Court’s citation to Brown & Williamson in a case
interpreting the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) by explaining that
Brown & Williamson “relied on the first step of the Chevron analysis
to determine that Congress had spoken to the precise issue in question,
impliedly repealing the grant of jurisdiction on which the [FDA]
35. Id. at 136.
36. Id. at 137.
37. Id. at 132 (quoting Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
38. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
39. Id. at 159.
40. Id. To support this new pronouncement, the Court quoted then-Judge Stephen Breyer’s
1986 essay, Judicial Review of Questions of Law & Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986).
Justice Breyer, incidentally, dissented from the majority’s opinion. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
at 161–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Sunstein, supra note 3, at 241 (discussing Justice
Breyer’s dissent and describing it as a “power rebuttal to his own argument from 1986”).
41. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 161 (“Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’
subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the
authority that it seeks to exercise here.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S.
218, 231 (1994) (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even
more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’
rate-filing requirements.”).
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relied.”44 Accordingly, he explained, Brown & Williamson is
“obviously inapt” where Congress has not “‘spoken directly’ to the
subject in any way beyond the text of the CSA.”45 In another case,
Justice Scalia explained that “Chevron establishes a presumption that
ambiguities are to be resolved (within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation) by the administering agency.”46 Thus, at least as
originally articulated, the major questions doctrine was envisioned as
an application of Chevron. “The implausibility of Congress’ leaving a
highly significant issue unaddressed,” according to Justice Scalia, “is
assuredly one of the factors to be considered in determining whether
there is ambiguity, but once ambiguity is established the consequences
of Chevron attach.”47
II. STEP ZERO SIDE-STEP: GONZALEZ V. OREGON AND KING V.
BURWELL
Growing discomfort with Chevron among the Justices,48 however,
may be steering the major questions doctrine away from its doctrinal
origin. Rather than applying the doctrine at Chevron step one, the
Court is using it to deny deference at Chevron step zero (discussed
below) but also at Chevron step two (discussed in Section III).
First, what is step zero? The term, crafted by Thomas Merrill and
Kristin Hickman, describes the step taken by courts before moving on
to Chevron step one,49 that is, the “inquiry into whether the Chevron
framework applies at all.”50 Like Justice Scalia, Cass Sunstein regards
MCI and Brown & Williamson as step one cases, not as step zero
cases.51 “The reason,” Sunstein said, “is that there is no justification for
the conclusion that major questions should be resolved by courts rather
than agencies.”52 That there may be some distinction between big
questions and little ones seems to come from then-Judge Breyer’s essay
44. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 291 n.6 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61).
45. Id.
46. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Given the concerns raised by some Members of this Court . . . , it seems necessary and
appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how
courts have implemented that decision.” (citations omitted)).
49. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 90 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001).
50. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 191.
51. Id. at 243.
52. Id.
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on Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy.53 In his article,
which was cited by the Court in Brown & Williamson,54 then-Judge
Breyer argued that “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer
themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”55 To that
end, questions that raise important and delicate legal questions may
not have been delegated to executive agencies to answer.56 On its face,
this distinction may seem sensible, but Cass Sunstein retorts “as with
the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions,
the difference between interstitial and major questions is extremely
difficult to administer.”57 The analogy was perhaps prophetic.
In 2013, the Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC,58 holding that
an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity concerning the scope
of its regulatory authority (i.e., its jurisdiction) is entitled to deference
under Chevron.59 “[T]he distinction,” Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority,
“between
‘jurisdictional’
and
‘nonjurisdictional’
60
interpretations is a mirage.” And applying Chevron to “big,
important” matters as well as “humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff” does
no disservice to Chevron.61 Indeed, the Court—citing to both MCI and
Brown & Williamson—“ha[s] applied Chevron where concerns about
agency self-aggrandizement are at their apogee: in cases where an
agency’s expansive construction of the extent of its own power would
have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”62
Though not a major questions case itself, City of Arlington confirms
not only that MCI and Brown & Williamson are step one cases, but
also that major questions can be addressed through Chevron.63

53. See Breyer, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
54. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
55. Breyer, supra note 40, at 370.
56. Id. at 371.
57. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 243.
58. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
59. Id. at 290.
60. Id. at 297.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 303–04 (referring to both FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000) and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)).
63. See id. at 303–04 (discussing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 and noting that “the
threshold question was the ‘appropriate framework for analyzing’ the FDA’s assertion of
‘jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products,’—a question of vast ‘economic and political
magnitude[.]’ ‘Because this case involves an administrative agency’s construction of a statute that
it administers,’ we held, Chevron applied.” (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126, 132,
133)).
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In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts expressed his fundamental
disagreement with City of Arlington. He believed that administrative
agencies enjoyed “a significant degree of independence”64 and
“wield[ed] vast power” over “every aspect of daily life.”65 Whether
Congress has conferred a power to act, therefore, “is the ‘relevant
question[] of law’ that must be answered before affording Chevron
deference.”66 To support his position, Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the first major questions case to follow Brown &
Williamson—Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).67
A. Gonzales v. Oregon
Gonzales is not always considered a major questions case; Cass
Sunstein, for example, does not describe it as one in Chevron Step
Zero.68 Blake Emerson, however, identifies Gonzales as a “somewhat
different[]” application of the major questions doctrine.69 The question
in the case was whether the Controlled Substances Act authorized the
U.S. Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, even when a state law
permitted the procedure.70 The Court declined to recognize an implicit
delegation of rulemaking authority to the Attorney General.71 The
Court, citing Brown & Williamson, reasoned that the interpretive rule
construing the Controlled Substances Act to prohibit the prescription
of certain drugs used in physician-assisted suicide “did not fall under
the Chevron framework, because Congress would not have delegated
authority over an issue of such political significance through the
statute’s registration provisions.”72 The Attorney General, unlike the
expert agencies in MCI and Brown & Williamson, held no special

64. Id. at 313. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
66. Id. at 317.
67. See id. at 321 (“Adams Fruit, Mead, and Gonzales thus confirm that Chevron deference
is based on, and finds legitimacy as, a congressional delegation of interpretive authority.”).
68. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 191 n.19 (characterizing the inquiry in Gonzales as being
decided at step zero).
69. Emerson, supra note 23, at 2037.
70. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 248–49 (2006).
71. See id. at 245 (“The specific respects in which the Attorney General is authorized to
make rules under the CSA show that he is not authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a
medical standard for patient care and treatment specifically authorized under state law.”).
72. Emerson, supra note 23, at 2037; see Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267 (“The idea that Congress
gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in
the CSA’s registration provision is not sustainable.”).
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expertise in carrying out the interpretative power allegedly invested in
him by Congress.73 As a result, the Court owed no deference under
Chevron to the Attorney General.74 But, as noted above, Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Gonzales called out the majority’s citation to Brown
& Williamson as a basis to side-step application of Chevron.75
B. King v. Burwell
Several years after Gonzales, the Court again invoked a major
questions principle to deny Chevron deference to a federal agency, this
time, Justice Roberts writing for the majority.76 In King v. Burwell, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a rule implementing a tax credit
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.77 The
provision, according to the Court, is central to the statutory scheme
and the question of whether tax credits are available on Federal
Exchanges was “a question of deep ‘economic and political
significance.’”78 And, as in Gonzales, the administrative actor had no
expertise in the particular area of regulation.79 Accordingly, the Court
declined to apply Chevron and determined that “it must itself

73. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269 (“The deference here is tempered by the Attorney
General’s lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any consultation with anyone
outside the Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judgment.”).
74. See id. at 268 (“Since the Interpretive Rule was not promulgated pursuant to the
Attorney General’s authority, its interpretation of ‘legitimate medical purpose’ does not receive
Chevron deference.”).
75. See id. at 291 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The other case cited by the Court, FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000), is
even more obviously inapt. There we relied on the first step of the Chevron analysis to determine
that Congress had spoken to the precise issue in question, impliedly repealing the grant of
jurisdiction on which the Food and Drug Administration relied. 529 U.S., at 160–161, 120 S. Ct.
1291. Here, Congress has not expressly or impliedly authorized the practice of assisted suicide, or
indeed ‘spoken directly’ to the subject in any way beyond the text of the CSA.”).
76. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (finding that this was an
“extraordinary case[]” where “there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000); Emerson, supra note 23, at 2022 (summarizing the holding of King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)).
77. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487; Emerson, supra note 23, at 2038; see also Health Insurance
Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602)
(explaining the final regulations relating to the health insurance premium tax credit enacted by
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010).
78. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014)).
79. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated
this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”).

Skinner-Thompson_FINAL_5.22.20 (Do Not Delete)

302

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

5/24/2020 10:19 PM

[Vol. XXX:293

‘determine the correct reading’ of the tax credit provision.”80
Perhaps Gonzales and King are not appropriate Chevron cases,
and, therefore, not truly major questions cases. In Chevron, the Court
addressed an “agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers,”81 which “necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.”82 Both MCI and Brown & Williamson addressed
interpretations proffered by the designated executive agencies. But in
Gonzales and King, the executive agencies were acting outside their
substantive fields. In such cases, absent clear Congressional intent, the
Court found it would not be appropriate to defer, because the
interpretations were advanced by non-expert agencies.83 The cases are,
perhaps, appropriately viewed as outside the Chevron framework and
not truly applications of MCI and Brown & Williamson. To that end,
there may be parallel major questions doctrines: 1) Congress is unlikely
to delegate authority to answer major questions implicitly to a nonexpert agency (Gonzales and King); and 2) Even expert agencies must
have clear authorization to adopt transformative interpretations of
statutes they administer (MCI and Brown & Williamson).
III. STEP TWO CONFUSION: UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V.
EPA (UARG)
Against a backdrop of growing scientific consensus on the
implications of unregulated greenhouse gas emissions, a group of
States, local governments, and private organizations petitioned the
Court to review whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
“has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles; and if so, whether [EPA’s] stated reasons for
refusing to do so are consistent with the [Clean Air Act (CAA)].”84
This case, Massachusetts v. EPA,85 arose after EPA denied a
rulemaking petition, explaining, in part, “that it was ‘urged on in this
view’ by [the] Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson.”86 The Court
took a different view.
80. Leske, supra note 3, at 497 (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489).
81. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 843.
83. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated
this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”
(citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 266–67 (2006))).
84. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
85. Id. at 505.
86. Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
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In a 5-4 decision, the Court “found critical at least two
considerations” that distinguished Brown & Williamson from the case
at hand—and, for this reason, Massachusetts is not a major questions
case.87 First, the Court explained that the statutory scheme of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act would have required tobacco to be
immediately banned from the marketplace once the FDA asserted
regulatory authority over tobacco products, which was clearly contrary
to congressional intent.88 Second, the FDA repeatedly disclaimed
authority to regulate tobacco in congressional hearings, in light of
which Congress enacted tobacco-specific legislation that “effectively
ratified the FDA’s previous position that it lacks jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco.”89
The Court found no counterpart in EPA’s regulation of
greenhouse gases. Recognizing that Congress “might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming,” the Court believed that Congress “did understand that
without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the [CAA] obsolete.”90 Thus,
Congress’ decision to use “broad language . . . reflects an intentional
effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such
obsolescence.”91 Accordingly, the Court held that EPA has statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under Title II of the
CAA.92
Massachusetts seemed to settle the major questions debate when
it comes to climate change and the CAA. In fact, the Court thereafter
confirmed that Congress designated EPA “as best suited to serve as
primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions.”93 In American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), eight states, New York City, and
three land trusts brought a federal common law nuisance claim against
five major electric power companies, requesting injunctive relief to cap
and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from these companies over a
period of years.94 The Court held that the CAA, however, had
displaced federal common law since “Congress delegated to EPA the
87.
88.
89.
(2000)).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 531.
Id.
See id. (referring to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011).
Id. at 415.
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decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from
power plants.”95
A. UARG
After Massachusetts (and as acknowledged in AEP), EPA began
considering whether greenhouse gas emissions should be regulated
under Title II of the CAA.96 In doing so, EPA believed that:
[O]nce greenhouse gas emissions became regulated under any part
of the [CAA], the PSD and Title V permitting requirements would
apply to all stationary sources with the potential to emit greenhouse
gasses in excess of the statutory thresholds: 100 tons per year under
Title V, and 100 or 250 tons per year under the PSD program
depending on the type of source.97

EPA hesitated. A plain reading of its Title V and Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) programs “would constitute an
‘unprecedented expansion of EPA authority that would have a
profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch
every household in the land,’ yet still be ‘relatively ineffective at
reducing greenhouse gas concentrations.’”98 Recognizing these
complications, EPA announced steps to “tailor” the PSD and Title V
programs to greenhouse gases—referred to as the Tailoring Rule.99 For
sources that otherwise triggered PSD requirements, so called
“anyway” sources, EPA would require compliance with “best available
control technology” (BACT) emission standards for greenhouse gases.
The Court, in a split opinion, rejected the Tailoring Rule but upheld
the applicability of greenhouse gas BACT requirements to “anyway”
sources.100
1. The Court Rejects the Tailoring Rule
The Tailoring Rule was rejected by the Court in a 5-4 decision.101
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, structured this aspect of the
95. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
96. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310 (2014); see also Am. Elec. Power,
564 U.S. at 417–18 (discussing EPA’s actions following the Massachusetts decision).
97. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 310. For the sake of brevity, the PSD program
concerns pre-construction permits and Title V concerns operating permits.
98. Id. at 310–11 (quoting Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act,
73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,355 (July 30, 2008)).
99. See generally Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (discussing the mechanics of the Tailoring
Rule).
100. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 332.
101. Id. at 302.
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Court’s ruling into three parts. First, the Court determined that EPA
was not compelled to regulate greenhouse gases under the PSD and
Title V programs.102 Second, the Court rejected EPA’s rationale that
the agency could exercise discretion when including greenhouse gases
under the PSD and Title V programs.103 And third, the Court
concluded that EPA had no power to tailor its regulation of
greenhouse gases in the face of unambiguous statutory terms.104
Under the second part, Justice Scalia articulated two independent
reasons for rejecting EPA’s rationale in this case. To start, Chevron’s
deferential framework requires that agencies “operate ‘within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation.’”105 And in line with this
instruction, “an agency interpretation that is ‘inconsisten[t] with the
design and structure of the statute as a whole,’ does not merit
deference.”106 Here, a plain reading of the statute would require several
million new permits and would “place plainly excessive demands on
limited governmental resources.”107 Accordingly, the majority
reasoned that Congress could not have intended for the PSD and Title
V programs to ordinarily apply to greenhouse gas emissions.
But the Court did not end there. Justice Scalia said that “EPA’s
interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization.”108 Justice Scalia wrote:
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American
economy,” we typically greet its announcement with a measure of
skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign
to an agency decisions of vast “economic and political
significance.”109

In citing Brown & Williamson, the Court rejected EPA’s position that

102. See id. at 320 (“In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any
air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V . . . to exclude those atypical pollutants
that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically
transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.”).
103. Id. at 321.
104. Id. at 327.
105. Id. at 337 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 298 (2013)).
106. Id. (quoting Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 339 (2013)).
107. Id. at 323–24 (stated after an overview of the PSD and Title V programs).
108. Id. at 324.
109. Id. (quoting Brown v. Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 159, 160 (2000)) (citing MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) and Indus. Union Dept., AFLCIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645–46 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
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it was entitled to deference under Chevron step two.110
In part three, Justice Scalia concluded that “[a]n agency has no
power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting
unambiguous statutory terms.”111 In the end, EPA never seemed to
contest that the statutory text would have required an “unprecedented
expansion” of its regulatory authority; indeed, that concern was the
basis for EPA’s argument that the agency was justified in
reinterpreting the plain language to avoid a clearly unreasonable
outcome.112
2. The Court Upholds BACT Emission Standards for Greenhouse
Gases
In a fractured opinion, the Court upheld BACT emission
standards for greenhouse gases.113 This time, Justice Scalia organized a
two-part ruling. First, the Court addressed concerns that BACT is
fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse gas regulation by turning to
EPA’s guidance on BACT limitations (decided 5-4); and second, the
Court deferred to EPA’s decision to require BACT for non-de minimis
amounts of greenhouse gas emissions from anyway sources (decided 72).114
Despite invoking Brown & Williamson with respect to the
Tailoring Rule, Justice Scalia refrained from applying the case to
interpreting BACT115 —defined as “an emission limitation based on
the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to
regulation” that is “achievable . . . through application of production
processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including
fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion
techniques.”116 Industry petitioners argued to the Court that BACT
“has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls”—e.g., pollution
110. Id. at 302.
111. Id. at 325.
112. Id. at 310–11.
113. See id. at 334 (“EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant
subject to regulation under this chapter’ for purposes of requiring BACT for ‘anyway’ sources.”).
114. Id. at 332.
115. See id. at 331–32 (“Whereas the dubious breadth of ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting
triggers suggests a role for agency judgment in identifying the subset of pollutants covered by the
particular regulatory program at issue, the more specific phrasing of the BACT provision suggests
that the necessary judgment has already been made by Congress. . . . Even if the text were not
clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result
in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpretation is
unreasonable.”).
116. 40 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1955).

Skinner-Thompson_FINAL_5.22.20 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2020]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EXTRAORDINARY CASES

5/24/2020 10:19 PM

307

controls that can be added to a smokestack—and applying BACT to
greenhouse gases would “make it more about regulating energy use,
which will enable regulators to control ‘every aspect of a facility’s
operation and design,’ right down to the ‘light bulbs in the factory
cafeteria.’”117 While EPA recognized that “compulsory improvements
in energy efficiency will be the ‘foundation’ of greenhouse-gas BACT,”
EPA “has long interpreted BACT as required only for pollutants that
the source itself emits.”118 With this in mind, Justice Scalia (writing for
a 5-4 majority) was not convinced that the same fears raised under the
Tailoring Rule were necessarily implicated by applying BACT to
greenhouse gases.119 The Court expressed no opinion on whether
“BACT may be used to force some improvements in energy efficiency”
or whether EPA could use other statutory mechanisms to obtain
“reductions in a facility’s demand for energy from the electric grid.”120
Finally, in a 7-2 decision, the Court concluded that EPA
reasonably decided to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by
sources otherwise subject to PSD review.121 Here, Justice Scalia
reasoned that “[e]ven if the text [of the BACT provision] were not
clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously
unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of
agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpretation is
unreasonable.”122
In MCI and Brown & Williamson, the Court focused its inquiries
on Congress’ unambiguous intent.123 In Gonzales and King, the Court
denied Chevron deference to agencies that were acting outside of their
expert capacities. In UARG, however, Justice Scalia seems to invoke
Brown & Williamson while assessing the reasonableness of EPA’s
interpretation. Although he omits any reference to Chevron step two,
Justice Scalia proceeds to consider whether EPA’s interpretation is
“permissible,” which ordinarily provides EPA with judicial

117. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 330 (2014).
118. Id. at 330–31.
119. Id. at 331–33.
120. Id. at 330–31.
121. Id. at 331.
122. Id. at 332.
123. “Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’ subsequent
tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it
seeks to exercise here.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)
(emphasis added); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231
(1994) (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry
will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion . . . .”).
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deference.124 In fact, “a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”125 But here Justice Scalia dismisses that
provision by presuming judicial skepticism when agency decisions may
have “vast ‘economic and political significance.’”126
How then does one reconcile UARG with the step one analyses in
MCI and Brown & Williamson? If we recall, Justice Scalia also said
that “once ambiguity is established the consequences of Chevron
attach.”127 Perhaps, he might have responded that UARG stands for the
proposition that courts must still “tak[e] seriously, and apply[]
rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.”128
Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go
beyond it; and where Congress has established an ambiguous line, “the
agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.”129 In
UARG, it may be difficult to imagine a term “less ambiguous than the
precise numerical thresholds” established by Congress.130 So replacing
those numbers with figures an order of magnitude greater may have
clearly gone beyond the bounds of statutory authority.131
IV. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: MAJOR RULES AND NONDELEGATION
Though MCI, Brown & Williamson, and UARG all clearly applied
Chevron to extraordinary cases of administrative law, then-Judge
Kavanaugh added a new twist on the major questions doctrine: “while
the Chevron doctrine allows an agency to rely on statutory ambiguity
to issue ordinary rules, the major rules doctrine prevents an agency

124. To the extent that this part relates to Chevron step one, however, Justice Scalia seems
to require that Congressional intent not only be clear but that it be really clear when an agency’s
decision may have “vast ‘economic and political significance.’” Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S.
at 324 (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160). Such a requirement would seem to be an
insurmountable hurdle to Chevron step two: either the statute is clear or it is not. The Court could
have concluded that Chevron step two was never implicated, however, because the statutory
thresholds for Title V and PSD are clear. Citing Brown & Williamson in this context would have
been appropriate.
125. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
126. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
160).
127. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
128. City of Arlington, v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
129. Id.
130. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 326.
131. Id.
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from relying on statutory ambiguity to issue major rules.”132 “Major
rules,” in other words, must be authorized by clear congressional
authorization—not Chevron step two.133
So, what is a major rule? Judge Kavanagh’s dissent in United States
Telecom Association v. FCC provides some insight on the factors he
found relevant (though he concedes the task “has a bit of a ‘know it
when you see it’ quality”),134 including: “the amount of money involved
for regulated and affected parties, the overall impact on the economy,
the number of people affected, and the degree of congressional and
public attention to the issue.”135 And “when an agency relies on a longextant statute to support the agency’s bold new assertion of regulatory
authority,” the Court’s concern is likely to be heightened.136
This twist on the major questions doctrine is not subtle. Under the
former doctrine, the question must have vast economic and political
significance: can the FDA ban tobacco products? Can EPA regulate
greenhouse gases under Title II of the CAA? What about under Title
I (concerning National Ambient Air Quality Standards and certain
stationary source regulations) and Title VI (concerning stratospheric
ozone protection)? Judge Kavanaugh expands the inquiry past whether
an agency can regulate and looks at how—that is, did Congress
authorize this specific rule, because it has economic and political
significance? But what of rules that involve a mix of statutory terms,
some clear and others ambiguous? Does every aspect of the rule
require clear authorization? If not, what components are “ordinary”
versus “major”?
Perhaps it may not matter. Just last year, Justice Kavanaugh
suggested a new direction for exceptional cases, inspired by Justice
Rehnquist’s concurrence in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute137 and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy
v. United States.138 In Industrial Union, Justice Rehnquist believed “that
132. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
133. There are some who believe that Justice Kavanaugh’s “major rules” doctrine can bridge
the gap between Chevron and a resurgent interest in the nondelegation doctrine. See generally
Michael Sebring, Note, The Major Rules Doctrine: Host Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Novel Doctrine
Can Bridge the Gap Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 189 (2018). Nathan Richardson might agree, warning “Chevron’s virtues in ordinary
cases . . . are not worth risking.” Richardson, supra note 6, at 355.
134. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423.
135. Id. at 422–23.
136. Id. at 423.
137. 448 U.S. 607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
138. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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delegations of legislative authority must be judged according to
common sense.”139 In Gundy, Justice Gorsuch warned that the
“intelligible principle” test threatens the separation of powers and
“accelerate[s] the flight of power from the legislative to the executive
branch.”140 Those opinions, Justice Kavanaugh explains, would not
allow congressional delegations to agencies of authority to decide
major policy questions—“even if Congress expressly and specifically
delegates that authority.”141 The consequences of this nondelegation
approach to extraordinary cases are even less clear.142
Consider again Massachusetts v. EPA.143 There the Court
explained that Congress’ use of broad language was an intentional
delegation of authority to EPA to address changing circumstances and
scientific developments.144 But if Congress cannot delegate major
policy questions to an agency (even to resolve a matter for which the
agency is a recognized expert), will Massachusetts and AEP be
overturned by implication? And what about applying BACT to
anyway sources? Who decides what is a major policy question anyhow?
While we might agree that climate change regulation fits comfortably
within the major questions doctrine, Cass Sunstein warned that “the
difference between interstitial and major questions is extremely
difficult to administer.”145 What about considering climate change
when conducting an environmental impact statement as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act? Does that cross an
unconstitutional line? Under a nondelegation theory of the major
questions doctrine, Congress might be prohibited from delegating
those questions to the executive branch altogether.
V. ON CLIMATE CHANGE
This section addresses a hypothetical regulation under the CAA.

139. Indus. Union., 448 U.S. at 675.
140. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142.
141. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari).
142. Or perhaps they are clear. See Ann Carlson, Greenhouse Gas Regulations Under the
Clean Air Act Are Doomed, https://legal-planet.org/2019/11/27/greenhouse-gas-regulationsunder-the-clean-air-act-are-doomed/ (last visited May 20, 2020) (“The only question now is
whether [Justice Kavanaugh] will use what is known as the ‘major questions’ doctrine, the ‘nondelegation’ doctrine, or some combination of the two to strike [EPA regulations of greenhouse
gases] down.”).
143. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
144. Id. at 532.
145. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 243.
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Section 111(b) of the CAA authorizes the Administrator to issue
nationally applicable standards limiting air pollution from “new
sources” in source categories that cause or significantly contribute to
air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.146 When EPA issues such a standard, section 111(d)
authorizes EPA to require—under certain circumstances—states to
regulate existing sources in the same category.147
In 2013, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum directing
EPA to issue standards under section 111(d) to address carbon
pollution from existing power plants.148 To that end, in 2015, EPA
issued the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which established section 111(d)
guidelines for states to follow in limiting CO2 emissions from existing
fossil fuel-fired power plants.149 The guidelines were based on EPA’s
determination of the “best system of emission reduction,” an
undefined statutory term.150 The CPP’s best system of emission
reduction was based on the combination of three “building blocks.”151
They were, 1) efficiency improvements for coal-fired power plants152;
2) substitution of existing gas-fired generation in place of existing coalfired generation153; and 3) substitution of new zero-emitting renewable
generation for both existing coal- and gas-fired generation.154 The CPP
faced significant opposition, and on February 9, 2016, the Supreme
Court issued an unprecedented stay of the rule.155
The crux of the challenge was that EPA’s second and third
building blocks represented an unprecedented expansion of statutory
authority. Opponents, citing to the major questions doctrine, requested
that the court apply a different standard of review for an issue of such
great economic and political significance.156 EPA countered that the
correct course is to apply Chevron, reasoning that the major question
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
148. Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, Memorandum for the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (June 25, 2013), in 78 Fed. Reg. 39,535, 39,535–36 (July 1,
2013).
149. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015).
150. Id. at 64,762.
151. Id. at 64,667.
152. Id. at 64,787.
153. Id. at 64,795.
154. Id. at 64,803.
155. West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
156. Opening Brief of Petitioner on Core Legal Issues at 32–36, West Virginia v. EPA, No.
15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), Doc. 1610010.
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of whether to regulate carbon emissions from power plants had already
been answered in AEP—in fact, the Court specifically identified
section 111 as the appropriate regulatory scheme157—and the more
technical question of how to regulate was a matter for Chevron.158
On March 28, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive
Order 13783, which specifically called for a review of the CPP and a
proposal to “suspend[], revis[e], or rescind[]” it.159 On July 8, 2019,
EPA published its final repeal of the CPP and a replacement, called
the Affordable Clean Energy Rule.160 That rule identified a best system
of emission reduction based on “candidate technologies” that EPA
believed would lead to efficiency improvements at existing coal-fired
power plants.161 That rule also faces significant opposition.162
Consider now a hypothetical alternative regulation: a best system
of emission reduction based on the combination of carbon capture
technologies and a cap-and-trade allowance system. Such an approach
would be modeled on the George W. Bush Administration’s Clean Air
Mercury Rule (CAMR), which was also promulgated under section
111(d).163
Suppose first that everyone agrees that carbon capture technology
is clearly a “system of emission reduction” that can be applied to
157. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,778.
158. See Respondent EPA’s Initial Brief at 40–46, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. Mar 28, 2016), Doc. 1609995 (explaining why the Chevron two-step is the proper standard of
review and under this standard the EPA’s interpretation is entitled to deference).
159. Exec. Order No. 13,783 § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017).
160. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
161. Id. at 32,536.
162. See id. at 32,521 (noting that the repeal received over 1.5 million comments during the
notice and comment period).
163. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005). The regulatory history of mercury
emissions from power plants may be informative for other reasons. CAMR was ultimately
vacated on grounds unrelated to EPA’s interpretation of section 111. New Jersey v. EPA, 517
F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Obama Administration responded with the Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards issued under section 112, which the Administration successfully defended in the
D.C. Circuit. White Stallion Energy, 748 F.3d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, however, industry claimed that Congress “did not assign authority to EPA to act
without consideration of costs.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (No. 14-47), 2014 WL 3530750, at *35. And “[e]ven if one assumes for
purposes of argument . . . that ‘appropriate and necessary’ is ambiguous, that would still mean
that, under Brown & Williamson, EPA’s cost-blind interpretation is unreasonable and therefore
unlawful.” Id. While the Court ultimately granted cert, its opinion failed to mention the major
questions doctrine. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
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individual power plants. The next step in EPA’s evaluation then is to
account for costs (financial as well as environmental) in determining
whether this system is indeed the “best” one for reducing emissions.
As many powerplants age, retrofitting them with costly new
controls may not be financially sound.164 But some owners may decide
it is appropriate or economically viable. By assessing the technology in
light of a cap-and-trade program, the technology might be not only
more broadly applicable, but also economically feasible. That is, if an
emission standard is set such that installation of carbon capture
technologies could generate emission credits, those owners could 1)
subsidize the installation of costly controls; and 2) allow other plants to
operate without capturing their emissions (by making up the difference
through the acquisition of emission credits).
The question then is whether this would be an exceptional case in
administrative law. The following tries to answer this question applying
each manifestation of the major questions doctrine.
First, EPA has previously interpreted “system of emission
reduction” to include the combination of a cap-and-trade program and
control technology.165 EPA might argue, as it did in defense of the
Clean Power Plan, that the question of whether the agency can regulate
carbon emissions from existing power plants has already been
addressed by the Court in AEP,166 and the question of how to regulate,
therefore, is assessed under Chevron. Further, the combined cap-andtrade/technology system does not bring about a transformative
expansion of agency authority. Thus, the major questions doctrine
would not be triggered at Chevron steps zero, one, or two.
Now consider the same scenario under a “major rules” analysis.
164. See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines
Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,547 (discussing commenters that noted “that it can
be much costlier and more technically challenging to retrofit” existing power plants as compared
to newly constructed ones); see also id. at 32,548 (“[T]he costs of retrofitting pollution controls on
an existing facility generally are greater than the costs of installing pollution controls on a new
facility.”).
165. Id. at 32,526 n.65 (quoting CAMR). Although environmental groups challenged this
prior interpretation, see Final Opening Brief of Environmental Petitioners at 25–28, New Jersey
v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1097), 2007 WL 2155491, it was generally supported
by power companies, see Brief of Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group at 7–9, New Jersey v.
EPA, (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1097), 2007 WL 3231253, at *7–9 (arguing instead that EPA could
not allow states to avoid implementing EPA’s best system for reducing mercury emissions from
existing coal-fired power plants).
166. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (“It is altogether fitting
that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator
of greenhouse gas emissions.”).
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Assuming there is significant political and public interest in the
regulation, which would be consistent with interest in the Clean Power
Plan and the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, judges could conclude
that the regulation is a “major rule.” As before, the CAA does not
define the phrase “system of emission reduction,” so EPA would rely
on its interpretive authority to conclude that the phrase encompasses a
cap-and-trade program (just like in CAMR). But as a major rule, EPA
would need to identify clear congressional authority to do so. We have,
potentially, two different standards of review based on the degree of
public interest: whereas CAMR might have been a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, EPA’s carbon rule
might fail because it lacks clear congressional authorization.
Finally, consider the situation should the Court conclude that
Congress has no power to delegate any major policy decisions to the
executive branch. Climate change policy is unquestionably a major
issue facing the legislative branch. While Massachusetts v. EPA
recognized that Congress may deliberately use capacious terms to
allow EPA to address unforeseeable or new environmental
challenges,167 and while AEP acknowledged that EPA was designated
the expert agency to address carbon emissions from existing power
plants,168 a nondelegation theory of the major questions doctrine would
thwart EPA’s authority to address climate change at all. In other
words, even a clearly authorized regulation under section 111—e.g.,
carbon capture control technology—would be prohibited because the
larger policy question of whether we should regulate carbon dioxide
cannot be delegated to the executive branch and must, instead, be
answered by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chevron recognized that challenges to agency interpretations
often “really center[] on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress.”169
Accordingly, the Court explained, “federal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.”170 But there are increasing calls to reconsider this
167. 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (“Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s
capacious definition of “air pollutant,” we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.”).
168. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 428.
169. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
170. Id.
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premise.171 Justice Roberts warns that while “the Constitution
empowers the President to keep federal officers accountable,
administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of
independence.”172 And this independence, he claims, counsels for
increased oversight of the “headless fourth branch of government.”173
In practice, however, addressing major questions may be an exception.
Though Presidents cannot or do not wish to “supervise so broad a
swatch of regulatory activity,”174 the promulgation, repeal, and
replacement of the Clean Power Plan suggests that promulgating major
rules are supervised by the President (and thus are democratically
accountable decisions).
The constitutional debate over Chevron may one day face a
reckoning. But until that day, administrative law’s extraordinary cases
should be assessed at Chevron step one. As Justice Scalia once
explained—the implausibility of Congress’ leaving a highly significant
issue unaddressed should be considered in determining whether there
is ambiguity, but once ambiguity is established the consequences of
Chevron should attach. This ensures that judges “respect legitimate
policy choices,” especially major policy choices, without injecting
personal preferences into that judgment.175

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 313.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.

